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At least three ot these hooks are taith statements. 
One is a summa or an apologia (the distinction is 
rarely clear) and one is a sequel to an earlier summa. 
They are worth considering from that perspective at 
a time when medical ethics is being treated in 
Australia as yet another value-neutral technology: 
“All medical students should do communications 
skills. so they can manage the difficult patient better. 
Oh, yes -~ and ethics, too”. 
It is usually thought poor form to refer to a writer 
personally, before considering his book. There is a 
temptation to transgress the rule in the case of 
Tristram Engelhardt because he has been one of the 
more noticeable performers at major ethics 
conferences in Australia in 1986 and 1987. On each 
occasion he has played the role of the Texas 
libertarian - a state (in both senses) where cowboy 
boots add a macho inch, where a man must do what 
a man must do and where he may need a gun to do it. 
Engelhardt has also displayed impressive erudition 
in three or four languages and two disciplines -he 
carries a scholar’s six-gun. 
It is Engelhardt’s opinion. shared with 
Maclntyre, that the Western religious consensus 
evaporated after Luther and the Western hope of a 
rationalist and universal morality evaporated after 
the Enlightenment.’ Hence the current problem is 
“how to fashion an ethic for biomedical problems 
that can speak with rational authority across the 
great diversity of moral viewpoints”. Engelhardt 
thinks that codes of law and religious traditions are 
“too parochial or too arbitrary to bind together 
ind iv idua ls  f r o m  vary ing  t r a d i t i o n s  o r  
communities”. It follows that we need a secular 
bioethics but he can find no basis for secular ethics 
that does not lead to the brink of relativism. Faced 
with that difficulty, he argues that “ethics is an 
enterprise in controversy resolution”. If it achieved 
no more than that, ethics would be a socially 
valuable enterprise but, in travelling to that point, 
Engelhardt has already left behind the ‘Foundations’ 
in his title.* 
Relativism is a nuisance but distinct moral 
values, nurtured in communities, remain important 
because we learn through them what is good, 
worthwhile and right (or not) to do.’ There is a 
problem, however: the people who are trying to 
resolve controversy by ‘doing ethics’ are schooled in 
discrete moral values, nurtured in communities, and 
the principles that they can agree on will be low in 
content, while principles that are high in content will 
be difficult to generalize. This observation is the 
foundation of Engelhardt’s general argument that 
ethics is a contention between two principles, 
autonomy and beneficence. Autonomy has 
universal application but minimal informative 
content: beneficence can have substantial specific 
content but is culture-specific: 
“At the very roots of ethics there is a tension. . . 
between respecting the freedom and securing the 
best interests of persons“. 
Much of The Foundations of Rioethics 
represents an attempt to work through the 
consequences of that tension. In addition, 
Engelhardt finds himself obliged to discuss what is 
meant by “persons”. He makes the Kantian 
assumption that moral concern is focussed on 
persons, not just humans. A person in the strict sense 
‘Christie RJ and Hoffmaster CB. Eihical h u e s  in.fami/v medicine. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986. 
Daniels N. Just Health Care. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
Engelhardt HT. The Foundations of Rioethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Shelp EE. Born to die? Deciding the.fate qfcriticallv ill newborns. New York: The Free Press, 1986. 
Veatch R M .  The,foundations of justice: Why the retarded and the rest qfus have claims to equality. New 
York: Oxford llniversity Press, 1986. 
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is a moral agent, he says, to be distinguished from a 
person in the social sense, who is accorded rights 
without duties in a socially variable fashion. Moral 
persons must be self-conscious, free to choose, 
rational, and able to understand the pertinence of 
blame and praise. (People who care for the advanced 
aged might begin to worry, at this point, how many 
of their charges would pass the personhood test - 
and what is to be done to or for them if they do not 
pass.) 
Engelhardt claims that the intention of his 
distinction between persons in the strict and social 
senses is to make it impossible to duck the moral 
standard of persons in the strict sense. He defends 
the social assignment of social personhood on the 
grounds that “utilitarianism has been responsible for 
a great proportion of the liberal advances” in the 
rights of the retarded and the senile. That looks a 
particularly slippery defence: it depends not on 
philosophical arguments but on historical ones 
which many social historians would regard as 
unsettled. In addition, it is utilitarianism, whether 
claiming the label or not, which drives much present 
effort to retrench the rights of the retarded and the 
senile. To reduce the matter to a phrase, there is a 
high probability that Kantianism forced to marry 
utilitarianism will change its name to utilitarianism. 
The suspicion that what Engelhardt is defending 
is a Texas-libertarian-Kantian person deepens when 
he argues that human foetal and embryonic life have 
only the value that they have for actual (that is, 
social) persons. Actual persons contemplating the 
termination of a pregnancy may be social persons 
with mortgages and prospective careers; actual 
persons contemplating what might be needed to 
sustain decent care for the demented elderly are 
social persons who vote on taxes. Their taxes are 
paid to governments to which Engelhardt will allow 
only that authority which does not interfere with the 
“consensual action of free individuals, including the 
use of their private property”. 
In his chapters on “The Languages of 
Medicalization” and on “Free and Informed 
Consent”, Engelhardt does recognize the kinds of 
powers in society which make it difficult to settle for 
an ethic which concentrates on persons in the strict 
sense. Practitioners, who are active daily in health 
care, develop authority relative to patients, who are 
intermittent visitors to that arena. Professions with 
authority are likely to acquire political power that 
other people cannot command. Power and authority 
always threaten to push beneficence into the ditch of 
paternalism, where it will drown autonomy. 
Engelhardt recognizes these problems but his faith in 
the liberty of individuals makes it difficult for him to 
contemplate, say, the doctrines of justice which 
attract other ethicists. 
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Consider, for example, the story of Eddie 
Conrad, a mentally retarded 10-year-old with 
hearing, visual and speech impairments. Eddie’s 
school is unable to afford the intensive speech 
therapy he needs without cutting other services, like 
the art, music and physical education curricula. How 
are the parents, teachers and school to reconcile 
Eddie’s claims for fair treatment with those of the 
rest of the school community? Veatch begins 7he 
Foundations of Justice with this vignette and weaves 
it into his analysis of how to distribute health care 
resources justly. 
The Foundations of Justice builds on the thesis 
Veatch developed in A Theory of Medical Ethics.4 
In the Theory. . ., he argued that rational people 
would agree on a contract for their society which 
incorporated a number of basic ethical principles. 
Different philosophical assumptions and premises 
might motivate different people, so the contract 
would have three tiers: a broad, Rawlsian social 
contract on which all would agree; a second contract 
between society and the professions it licenses: and 
particular contracts - for example, between 
mothers and home-birthing doctors. One of the 
problems which the three-tiered approach 
acknowledged was that consensus seems to 
disintegrate when questions of justice and the 
allocation of resources are raised: religious thinkers, 
for example, tend to opt for an egalitarian notion of 
justice; secular thinkers hold a diversity of views. In 
Engelhardt’s terms, justice is rich in content but 
parochial in acceptability. 
In 7he Foundations of Justice Veatch sets 
himself the ambitious task of formulatinga principle 
of justice acceptable to all people. He begins with a 
historical survey of the notion of equality in Jewish 
and Christian thought, showing that both religions 
have maintained a stream of concern for the poor, 
the weak and the oppressed. The theological 
justification for this concern lies in their shared 
doctrines of God (before whom all people are equal 
in their finitude), Creation (all resources are a gift 
from God) and Stewardship (finite people have their 
resources on trust). From these doctrines it is only a 
short step to an egalitarian principle ofjustice which 
distributes resources between creatures (usually only 
human ones, in practice!) on the basis of need. 
Secular philosophers struggling with the 
principle of justice appeal not to faith but to reason 
and experience. Veatch considers the premises and 
arguments of these secular perspectives under three 
headings - Rawlsian egalitarianism, utilitarianism 
and Nozick’s entitlement position (which 
Engelhardt probably would find most congenial) - 
and finds that the logic and rationality dance upon 
an underlying set of unargued (and unarguable) 
assumptions about the nature of humanity, 
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ownership of property and human responsibility for 
others. Veatch’s assessment is that whether one 
adopts an egalitarian or antiegalitarian stance will 
depend ultimately on “faith moves” that are similar 
to those made within the Jewish or Christian 
tradition. 
Despite having argued that there is no logical 
priority of one set of beliefs over others, Veatch 
concludes that egalitarianism is the more “natural” 
and more “plausible” option. The rest of the book 
articulates a theory of justice which is radically 
egalitarian and demands striving for equality of 
outcome. His equality of outcome is really a very 
‘strong’ version of equality of opportunity: it would 
discriminate in favour of the person born with only 
four fingers to ensure to that person the same 
opportunity of winning the Chopin prize as someone 
with ten fingers. In practice, Veatch believes that this 
radical egalitarianism will mean directing far more 
resources into medical and educational services for 
the handicapped, so that their welfare, measured 
over a lifetime, is as close to the average as possible. 
Veatch recognizes some of the counter-intuitive 
implications of his conclusions. He notes that other 
ethical principles (for example, autonomy) may have 
claims against justice in some circumstances. He is 
also worried by what his concept of justice may 
mean for the ethic of competition. Taking sport and 
higher education as examples, he suggests that the 
only real arguments in favour of rewards relate to the 
good that those with natural ability may bring to 
the community. Concentrating less on competition 
and more on co-operation could only be good 
for society. 
The Foundations qf Justice is both an excellent 
introduction to egalitarian notions of justice and a 
lucid application of justice theory to the problems of 
the handicapped. However, Veatch’s arguments in 
favour of equality as the measure of a just society are 
unlikely to convince those who are not already 
sympathetic to his views. The ‘faith moves’that lead 
Veatch to adopt an egalitarian stance can not, on his 
own admission, logically compel others to do the 
same. Even people who would usually stand in the 
same camp as Veatch may find his hardline support 
for equal outcomes offensive. Perhaps the great 
strength of The Foundations of Justice is that it does 
set out clearly where radical commitment of equality 
in health care may lead. 
Whereas Veatch tackles ethical problems at a 
societal level, Shelp’s Born to Die? is concerned far 
more with decision-making at the level of 
individuals. Shelp is writing about who should be 
responsible for decisions concerning seriously ill 
newborns and how far that responsibility should 
extend. It would be particularly helpful for anyone 
looking for an ethical perspective on the literature on 
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parent-child relationships, legislative responses and 
developments in neonatal medicine. The ethics of 
neonatal intensive care is one of the classic topics of 
bioethics in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom (a point worth remarking on, given other 
divergences between the ethics industries of the two 
countries). It is also a topic about which the 
temptation is ever-present to collapse ethical 
dilemmas into technical rules.5 Shelp’s main thesis 
stands on three premises. The first is that, 
historically and legally, children have been 
considered in relation to their parents: accordingly, 
parents bear the chief responsibility for the care and 
nurture of children. Secondly, the parental role 
should be seen as one of preparing the child for 
independence: at a minimum, parents should aim to 
foster in their children “a capability to relate, 
communicate, ambulate and perform tasks of basic 
hygiene, feeding, and dressing”. Thirdly, the moral 
pluralism of our society legitimizes a broad range of 
parental responses to the dilemmas surrounding 
critically ill newborns. 
The thesis itself is that parents are the proper 
decision-makers in situations concerning the 
imperilled neonate. Provided that their choices 
comply with those of any reasonable member of the 
moral community (and Shelp adopts a fairly loose 
definition of ‘reasonable’), parents should be free to 
make any decision they think appropriate. The 
neonatologist’s role is that of a “sustaining presence” 
who advises and co-operates with parents who are 
responsible for deciding the fate of their infant. 
Indeed, Shelp concludes, parents who choose active 
euthanasia for an infant “who will never attain a 
personal existence, never experience life as a net 
value, and/or never achieve a minimum level of 
independence” should be supported in their 
decision. 
Shelp also suggests that human neonates are not 
‘persons’ in the same sense as normal older humans 
(not ‘persons in the strict sense’, as Engelhardt would 
define them) and that the kill/let die distinction has 
no moral force. While it may be difficult to sustain a 
distinction between killing and letting die in 
borderline situations in neonatal intensive care, the 
more general distinction between commissions and 
omissions has been regarded as necessary by legal, 
moral and religious traditions. We would all 
recognize the difference in moral responsibility 
between throwing a baby into a raging torrent and 
patrolling river banks in case babies fell in.6 The 
whole topic of parental responsibility is much more 
complex than Shelp’s treatment of it might indicate. 
For example, he does not address satisfactorily the 
question of how to deal with those parental choices 
which are not ‘reasonable’ whereas even Engelhardt, 
despite appearing to regard neonates as the property 
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of parents, rather than as persons in the strict sense, 
would secure some rights to them in the light of 
consequences relevant to each case. Veatch takes a 
different approach again. He argues that parents 
should pursue the welfare of their children in single 
minded fashion, without regard for competing 
interests outside their family unit. He does not 
appear to recognize that a parent’s notion of’child’s 
best interests’ might not be the child’s. I t  must be 
said, in addition, that Shelp’s position offers little 
support to the medical and nursing personnel who 
are left to stand on the sidelines ~ supporting in 
practice a decision they may not support in 
conscience.’ 
One older neonatologist of our acquaintance 
found Born /o Die.’>absorbing and illuminating. We 
suspect that at least some of his enthusiasm was due 
to the fact that Shelp was preaching to a convert. 
Readers are likely to find Shelp’s arguments 
persuasive only if they are predisposed to accept 
them. In short, you will need to share his “faith 
moves” to be convinced. 
Teachers of ethics to health care students become 
used to playing spot-theethical-issue in the neonatal 
intensive care unit and IVF clinic. Indeed, one 
feature of much of the voluminous American writing 
in bioethics is its concentration upon cases in 
extremis, in exotic settings. No doubt this is partly a 
reflection of the way in which medical work in 
America is organized but it does. also, fuel the 
misgiving that bioethics is a dance upon a stage of 
social arrangements and values that are not 
themselves subjected to ethical analysis. Just Health 
Care and Ethical Issues in Farnilv Medicine are 
important books in this connection because each 
represents an effort toaddress the health-care system 
as well as the obvious dilemmas which arise within 
its units. 
Norman Daniels has been gnawing away for 
several years at the ethical implications of the 
American health care system.” That material is 
pulled together and reworked, to some extent, in 
Jus/ Healrh Care: the first four chapters are an effort 
to spell out the philosophical implications of the title 
phrase; chapters five to eight apply the philosophy to 
questions of aged care, occupational health and the 
role of providers of health care; the last chapter is a 
brief enquiry into the usefulness for policy-makers of 
the kind of analysis presented in the preceding 
chapters. It must be said that the result is a collection 
of papers tending towards a theme, rather than a 
finished thesis. 
In his introduction Daniels observes that the 
cost-containing environment in the United States is 
not alive with interest in philosophical questions 
about justice in the distribution of healthcare. Given 
the role-in-exile of the unspeakable ‘L-word’ in the 
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recent American election, he is probably right! 
Indeed. even to raise the topic is to invoke a flock of 
‘L-questions’: 
“To find . . . principles of justice for health care 
we must address questions such as these: 
What kind of a social good is health care? What 
are its functions and do these make it different 
from other commodities? 
Are there social obligations to provide health 
care? 
What inequalities in  its distribution are morally 
acceptable? 
What limits d o  provider autonomy and 
individual liberties of physicians or patients place 
on the just distribtuion of health care?” 
In an effort to answer those questions, Daniels 
asks another: is health care special? His answer has 
been the point of much of the criticism of his work9 
and wanders over two chapters of this book. Some 
people argue that health care needs are not special, 
provided that each person has a fair share of 
resources and income, “adequate to meet reasonable 
needs”. Daniels holds that the scale used to measure 
needs should consider needs that are “objectively 
ascribable” and “objectively important”. To 
construct the better scale, he sets off after the notion 
of “species-typical functioning”, proceeding, by a 
rather circuitous argument, to define diseases as 
“deviations from the natural functional organization 
of a typical member of a species”. He asserts that the 
line between disease and absence of disease is 
generally agreed and easy to draw - though more 
than a few historians of concepts of disease would 
doubt it.’” His next step is a shift to the notion of 
“normal opportunity range”: individual shares of the 
normal range of talents and skills will not be equal 
because disease detracts from the capacity of an 
individual to command that position on the normal 
range of opportunity which “his skills and talents 
would have made available to him were he healthy”. 
With health care, as with education, one is 
addressing “needs which are not equally distributed 
among individuals” but the unequal distribution of 
those needs has “great strategic importance for 
opportunity”. At that point the Daniels L-faith 
statement appears: “from the perspective of 
justice, . . the moral function of the health care 
system must be to help guarantee fair equality of 
opportunity.” That bald statement raises the 
question of equity of access to health care, about 
which there is little consensus because “access is itself 
a complicated notion . .[;I health care services are 
non-homogenous [and] have many functions” and 
questions about equitable access reflect more basic 
questions about distributive justice. 
Daniels reviews a number of the accounts of 
what might be involved in equitable access to health 
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care before concentrating, appropriately in the 
present climate of economism, on the role of the 
market as a distributor. The market approach 
amounts to saying that access to health care is 
equitable if there are “no information barriers, 
financial barriers or supply anomalies that prevent 
access to a reasonable or decent basic minimum of 
health care services.” Even if the first three criteria 
were met, the difficulty would remain of deciding 
what is “a decent basic minimum”. To define it 
relative to existing social practices “risks 
incorporating into the decent basic minimum all that 
is already askew in the health care system”. 
In any case, Daniels argues, these attempts to 
specify the “good” in health care miss the point that 
the system’s capacity to enhance fair equality of 
opportunity is the best test ofitsjustice. Headds that 
a system providing fair equality of opportunity is 
compatible with a multi-tiered health care system, 
“provides a principled way of characterising the 
health services that fall in the socially guaranteed 
tier” and “does not insist on equality of amenities 
that do not affect health status”. Critics of the overtly 
two-tiered system which prevailed in Australia for 
many years (and threatens to return) - or observers 
of the‘creaming’and’dumping’which DRG funding 
promotes in American hospitals - might be less 
sanguine.” 
If our account of the first half of Just Health 
Cure seems laboured, we could plead the laborious 
style of the book, in mitigation- though that would 
constitute a second lapse of form. It would be fairer 
to Daniels to point out that he is a pioneer in the 
topics he has addressed: the number of American 
bioethicists with whom he could have debated his 
approach to public health and social justice is not 
large.’* The book is difficult but readers of this 
journal who have little appetite for philosophy 
should consider at least the chapter “Am I My 
Parents’ Keeper”and the chapters on the powers of 
the American Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration and on the dilemma between risk 
and opportunity which is involved in efforts to 
enforce workplace safety. All three chapters raise 
ideas which could enrich the discussions ofaged care 
and worker safety in Australia. 
Christie and Hoffmaster’s ethical perspective 
looks less like a faith statement than Engelhardt’s, 
Veatch’s or Daniels’ but their work has some of the 
evangelical tone that seems to go with family 
medicine. Like Daniels’, their work is remarkable 
because of their interest in a field of health care 
beyond the critical moment and the hospital setting. 
Like Daniels, again. they plough in a lonely 
paddock.’’ We have found, in addition, that the 
large range of cases in their book can help to draw 
useful ethical reflections from medical students who 
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have just returned from general practice placements. 
The first section of Ethical Issues in Farniiv 
Medicine deals with theoretical issues which arise 
from a role-description of family medicine not 
dissimilar to the description of general practice 
favoured by the Royal Australian College of 
General Practitioners. Family medicine/general 
p rac t ice  involves  provid ing  c o n t i n u i n g ,  
comprehensive care for the whole person, taking on 
“problems of living”, preventing ill-health and acting 
as the patient’s advocate in dealings with the health 
system. Christie and Hoffmaster argue that such a 
role creates a moral expectation that physicians will 
assume broad responsibility for the welfare of their 
patients and will intervene in the psychological, 
behavioural, social and environmental dimensions 
of their patients’ lives. 
The assumption of ‘broad responsibility’, 
Christie and Hoffmaster suggest, could mean that it 
is appropriate for the doctor to withhold a diagnosis, 
if giving information would harm the patient. At this 
point, all good libertarians (and lots of other good 
people) will throw up their hands and yell ‘What 
about autonomy?’ Christie and Hoffmaster suggest 
that autonomy is an ambiguous and abstract 
concept, of little value in the real world. To grant 
autonomy primary status is to relegate the physician 
to a passive role. The conclusion of this section of the 
book is that any framework for medical ethics 
founded only on a theoretical approach to ethical 
dilemmas can be of little help to the family physician. 
The second section of the book offers an 
alternative to the jaundiced view of ‘togdown’ 
approaches: it proposes a framework which begins 
with the scrutiny of cases and works up to principles. 
The authors explore the ethical problems which arise 
in family practice and use their definition of family 
medicine to offer guidelines for decision-making - 
for example, there is a well-balanced study of the 
practical and philosophical dimensions of 
controlling patients’ access to information, conflicts 
of values between patient and physician and 
intervening in patients’ lifestyles. The result is an 
admirable attempt to place the experience of the 
general practitioner on the ethical agenda. 
The attempt to provide a coherent theoretical 
framework is less successful. The ‘bottom-up’ 
approach is more ‘topdown’ than Christie and 
Hoffmaster care to admit; too often, the choice 
which they deem ethically appropriate is determined 
not by the peculiarities of the case but by the 
definition of family medicine which they have 
advocated. The chapter on autonomy is also 
particularly disappointing. Their argument that the 
principle of autonomy is open to a variety of 
mutually exclusive interpretations, and therefore 
useless in the real world, is simplistic. A more subtle 
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analysis would have chosen from the definitions 
offered that which best suited the work of the family 
physician, and balanced it judiciously against the 
commitment to patient welfare. 
We have described several of these books as faith 
statements: the title of our review suggests that we 
think it no bad thing if the description is valid. The 
choice of title, and our faith statement about 
bioethics, demand some comment. Bioethics is a 
boom topic in Australia, as it has been in America. 
Even in our little corner of the continent, the past 
four years have produced requests to teach or 
present papers on ethics to medical students, general 
nurses, physiotherapists, health surveyors, child 
welfare workers, paediatric nurses, medical 
administrators, political parties, hospital managers, 
radiotherapists, senior nursing staff, health and 
welfare chaplains, community nurses and medical 
educators and migrant nurses. Higher degree 
students keep bounding through the door. Earnest 
seekers after truth could easily have found 
themselves at an ethics conferencea month. In loftier 
circles, bioethies centres have sprung up around the 
country, Stntutory committees nnd public enquiries 
and pnrtinmentury committees and Law Reform 
Commissions have all addressed bioethical 
queatisns, The Commonwealth government hus set 
up a Natlonal Bioethieu Conuultative Committee to 
advlue on the &hied, legal and aoeial iasues arisina 
from aeientifle rrnd medierl teehnology ( pnptieula~ly 
npfoduetive technology), biomedieal and health 
related nueareh, and the provision and delivery of 
health sewiees, The National Health and Medied 
Weueamh Counell hab pfodueed a npofi on ethieu in 
teuwmh and tfbd to erttend it8 pP€itOedb to 0 t h  
Commonweaith tlieneieu, while Institutional review 
boafda; have become eommon, 
WhPt doeb all this mean7 Teaehini ethies 
pl;Oblem. h a y  h&dth=8efd@b UtudefW, 
ptaatieaily odented, ohen Bnd erue atudlee P relief 
from rote=iramIng, down to earflk and not too 
dlfhauit: piryln$ afrot=the=dllemmcr can be fun; 
analybing the ethleal nasonlng or ctltielting the 
man1 absumptlena may dmw iesb plnuditu. Some of 
the eammlttees rnd boatdb have fulfilled the 
dameetutiually neeebsafy, ethleaily vdid (In a 
beeulati pluniIst bealety) "entetprlbe of aontfovetby 
moiution"i Othetb have been neeuued of providing 
the thetatleiii meen  whleh will allow on@ gtoup of 
ddlvity hllh been designed t@ dtaw a mi-intle of lee1 
ptateutlon w e t  the ptoblematlu eonbequenaab of 
un be 
tinathet to pUtbU@ Itb bUblW5b Pb UfiUal. 8ome Of the 
technological change in medicine and some has been 
no more than a 'collapsing of ethical dilemmas into 
technical rules'. 
Not enough of the teaching, conferring and 
enquiring, in our opinion, has extended to the 
analysis of the values which drive Australian society 
when it is doing health business. It is rare, outside 
Catholic circles, to hear contributions which make a 
faith statement and explore its implications. By 
comparison, the Veatch and Engelhardt books are 
valuable, but different, examples of how the texture 
of ethical discussion might be enriched in our setting. 
Do Australians still form a consensus around 
egalitarian justice? If not, either what refurbishing of 
that concept is necessary to make it acceptable or 
what alternative value can bind us - where 'us'is the 
population at large or the public health cadre? What 
values drive the Medical Research Ethics 
Committee of the NH&MRC; how widely are they 
held; if they are not held widely, how is their 
particularity defended? What are the consequences, 
for the public health cadre or the medical profession 
or particular groups of 'the population at large', of a 
libettarian emphasis on individual autonomy? 
Here, as in America, in our opinion, too much of 
the ethice effort has been at the technolo&ally 
pointy end of the medical induitry, By comparison, 
the Daniels and Chrletie and Hoffmaeter books nre 
valunble becnuee they attend to topieu like general 
prrretiee and ~eeupntiontll henlth and are of the 
aged whieh will affect people for most of their live,. 
Whnt is the agenda of the national eommitteei nnd 
publie enquirlea in Australia? 1s the npndn yielded, 
by defwlt, to IVF and intensive enre? Whnt would 
need to k done to ensure that the committees m d  
enquiries engaged a broader sgeetrum of the 
population in a broadened agenda4 
The eonJunetion of faith and PWIOH with 
bioethles is a fefefence to an anelent debateP The 
key question In bioethles, au in ethies generally, ia the 
leefatie one, 'how should one live'?' That ia a 
valuing, purposive question, about the juutlflmtion 
queution is not the Soel;atl% of Kantlan one, whieh 
defineu morality by the rationality of ag~nts, but the 
Afistotelian anbwef,  which desefibes the 
hafmonious life of agpta iii themselves and In 
r;elation to other agents, It takeb stfonB aasumptlona 
- P faith - @bout the natun of life to shape an 
ethieal view about how it ahould be iived; It takeu 
pfaetlaal saaon to put the faith to wofk, in bioethias 
au in ethies ge~efaliy, 
of ilfti=aatiofib, The mest bBtiLtf&etOr;y &RbW@f to the 
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